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KOREA AND VIETNAM -
TWO CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENTS t
GISBFitT FLANZ
INTRODUCTION
HAVE been asked to discuss two recent constitutional
experiments which are of more than academic interest to
the American intellectual community. It was my good
fortune to be able to observe the drafting of both constitu-
tions at very close range and I shall endeavor to outline
a few pertinent comparisons.
In the case of the Korean experiment, I was privileged
to serve as one of two American advisors to -the Constitu-
tion Deliberation Committee of the Republic of Korea.
This was in the fall of 1962 and my services were rendered
at the request and expense of the Korean government.
Since that time I have made nine more trips to Korea as
the only foreign advisor to the Minister of Government
Administration and the Administrative Improvement Re-
search Commission, which was established three years ago.
It has been most gratifying to me to see the imple-
mentation of this constitution. Five years ago few Amer-
icans had any confidence that the Korean political system
could be effectively stabilized and even fewer ventured to
believe that the Republic of Korea could achieve sig-
nificant progress in the economic field. They were wrong,
as subsequent developments have clearly demonstrated.
Political stabilization has been very evident during the
past two years and the economic progress has been more
spectacular than most of us thought possible back in 1962
tAn address delivered at St. John's University on April 14, 1967.
*J.U.C. 1936, University of Prague; Fellow 1937, Geneva School of
International Studies; Depl. Sc. Pol. 1939, Free School of Political Science,
Prague; Ph.D. 1947, Princeton University; Professor of Government, New
York University.
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or even in 1964. None of this has been accidental because
the present leaders of the Republic of Korea understand
clearly that rapid and balanced economic development could
not materialize without effective stabilization.
My assignment in Vietnam was under different au-
spices. In Korea, as I indicated, I always served in an
individual capacity at the request of the Korean govern-
ment. In Vietnam, I served as Consultant to the United
States Department of State. Shortly after my arrival in
early October 1966, my advisory role was extended when
the Minister of Justice asked me to serve as Consultant
to him. At this moment, I am still serving in both
capacities.
Let me begin with a few preliminary remarks about
recent constitutional experiments in the developing coun-
tries.
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENTS IN THiE D .ELOPING
COUNTRIES
The so-called developing countries, which gained their
independence after World War II, have carried out experi-
ments with various constitutional designs which deserve
careful study.
In the new states that were formerly British colonies,
the impact of British institutions is quite apparent. But
this influence can easily be exaggerated. Institutions and
procedures can be copied but they function differently in
countries of widely divergent backgrounds. A comparison
of India and Pakistan or Jamaica and Trinidad would bear
this out.
As already suggested, the Constitution of the French
Fifth Republic has exerted considerable influence in the
countries of Asia and Africa that were formerly parts of
the French Empire. Just as in the formerly British col-
onies, superficial appearances can be misleading. Political
cultures differ from country to country, in spite of their
similarity in the formal political patterns.
Some of the communist-controlled countries of East
and Southeast Asia have recently been influenced by the
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Chinese as well as the Soviet totalitarian design. But,
as in the case of the Constitution of the Democratic Re-
public of Vietnam (1960), the new leaders have demon-
strated some originality and ingenuity in using such
documents for propaganda purposes.
The American influence has been comparatively slight
during the period following World War I. Whatever con-
scious borrowing there has been has concerned such specific
institutions as judicial review, federalism, the office of the
president and provisions for more effective administrative
management.
There has been a tendency to exaggerate the unique-
ness of the constitutional and political experiments that
are now under way in the developing countries. We have
tended to ignore the fact that many of the Latin American
countries have been struggling with similar problems for
a century and a half. Nowadays, we pay very little atten-
tion to the nation and state building experiments that
were carried out in the course of the nineteenth century
in Western, Northern and Southeastern Europe. Probably
even more relevant are the experiences after World War I
in the newly independent countries that were once integral
parts of the Austro-Hungarian, Czarist, German and Otto-
man Empires.
I would suggest that careful historical and analytical
studies would tend to show that many of the problems of
the present developing countries are by no means new. A
careful study of these experiments would cause us to look
more critically upon some of the more provocative theories
that have been advanced by some of the authors on the
subject of "nation building."
.The present behavioral approach to the study of com-
parative politics has produced many useful insights but
it should be balanced by scholarly studies of the stages of
constitutional and political developments in many countries
and cultures.
If one studies carefully some of the constitutional
experiments that were referred to earlier, one might readi-
ly conclude that the constitutions that have demonstrated
[ VOL.. 42
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stability and viability have one common characteristic.
They all managed to strike an effective balance between
elements of institutional strength and provisions for the
responsible exercise of fundamental rights. I use the
word balance because all the written constitutions which
have endured over a long period of time were based upon
a dynamic rather than a static equilibrium. This is cer-
tainly true of our own United 'States Constitution, the
Swedish Constitution of 1809, the Norwegian Constitution
(1814), the Belgian Constitution (1831) and its Western
European derivatives (Luxembourg, the Netherlands and
Denmark). The Swiss Constitution of 1848 is also a good
example. All of these constitutions that are more than
one hundred years old have been amended several times
but it has been relatively simple to modify certain opera-
tional aspects.
I do not mean to suggest that the amendment process
was simple. On the contrary, it was usually exceedingly
difficult to make major revisions, let alone "total revisions."
But it was possible to relax certain types of governmental
control in a gradual manner. This can be demonstrated
in tracing the modifications in the functioning of most of
the political rights. There was usually no need for con-
stitutional amendments to bring this about. Suffrage
provisions constituted the exception. On the other hand,
some of the important structural relations (legislative-
executive, central-local, civil-military) could usually not be
adjusted without constitutional amendments.
The liberalization of political regimes in Western and
Northern Europe about a hundred years ago was achieved
by making the cabinets responsible to their respective legis-
latures. However, it should be remembered that most of
the countries were operating under monarchical forms of
government and that the bureaucracy was not directly
affected by these changes. The instability resulting from
the non-confidence game was cushioned by the high pro-
fessional performance of career civil servants.
Liberalization also required some commitment to the
principle of local self-government or decentralization.
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However, this development did not go very far in countries
that had copied the Napoleonic pattern of centralized ad-
ministration.
The principle of civil supremacy over the military
establishment was often vigorously demanded but in prac-
tice this proceeded very slowly in most European countries.
Last, but not least, one should note that the gradualness
of the adjustment between the requirement of stability and
the desire for liberty was assured to a large extent by the
exceedingly slow process of extending the suffrage base.
Today the principle of universal suffrage is almost
generally established in the newly independent countries.
Thus a major adjustment has already been made. A well-
educated electorate, which has learned to use the political
party instruments, can expect to make considerable head-
way in pressing for legislation that would extend economic
and social legislation. It can exert considerable pressure
to repeal outmoded legislation.
But, as is generally recognized, political parties do not
function well in the developing countries and, therefore,
parliamentary systems of government have been disappoint-
ingly unsuccessful.
The majority of reputable scholars tend to agree that
in the developing countries, a strong executive is a pre-
requisite for the much needed political stability and con-
tinuity. Such a system carries with it certain obvious
dangers of abuse. However, they need not occur even in
periods of emergency if the constitutional framework is
well designed to provide for a continually functioning
system of checks and balances.
CONTEMPORARY 1rIINAMIEE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMIS
AND THE RELEVANCE Op THE KOR AN EXPERIMINT
Early last fall, after the election of the Vietnamese
Constituent Assembly, there was considerable discussion in
Saigon and in Washington concerning the "Korean model."
To the leaders of Vietnam, Korea provided a most hearten-
ing success story in the face of very serious and persistent
handicaps. Several members of the National Leadership
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Committee and the Constituent Assembly had either visited
Korea or made a careful study of the Constitution. My own
assignment was due to my familiarity with the Korean
constitutional experiment. It is, therefore, appropriate to
begin with a few general comparative remarks about the
two countries.
Vietnam and Korea have much in common. Both
countries have been victimized by Communist imperialism
and both territories have been divided. Korea fought gal-
lantly and successfully against Communist aggression be-
tween 1950 and 1953. With the strong support of the
United States, the Republic of Korea, Australia and other
forces of the free world, the government of Vietnam has
shown great determination in bringing its long and costly
struggle to a victorious end. Both countries experienced
profound disenchantment over the abuse of power by their
first presidents. Factionalism and corruption have had
disastrous consequences. Anarchy was prevented by the
intervention of the military. Korea introduced a civilian
government at the end of 1963. The Constituent Assembly
of Vietnam completed work on its new constitution on
March 18, 1967, and on April 1 the Constitution was of-
ficially proclaimed. A tight time schedule has already been
established to pave the way for a popularly elected gov-
ernment.
As the government of Vietnam embarks upon its task
of implementing the new Constitution, it may be appro-
priate to sketch some of the lessons that may be derived
from the recent Korean experience.
The most important lesson to be learned is the demon-
strated fact that stability can be achieved without sacrific-
ing liberty. In order to achieve this reconciliation, there
must be an effective system of checks and balances and
there must be ample guarantees for the exercise of funda-
mental rights. Institutions must be carefully devised so
as to provide the basis for the effective political mobiliza-
tion of all strata of society. There must be ample room
for flexibility and adjustment because the Constitution is
1967 ]
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merely the indispensable foundation for the continuing
process of institution building.
Some of the opinions that have been expressed con-
cerning the Korean constitutional development are based
upon the wording of the Constitution. There is as yet no
comprehensive study, either in Korean or any other lan-
guage, of how the system actually works. I shall endeavor
to indicate some of these aspects and also try to identify
some of the unsuccessful features.
Let me begin by outlining the manner in which the
Constitution was drafted.
On August 12, 1961, General Chung Hee Park, Chair-
man of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction,
had reconfirmed his pledge that civil government would
be restored in 1963. A very important step in that direc-
tion was taken on July 11, 1962, when nine members of the
Supreme ,Council for National Reconstruction were appoint-
ed to serve as the Constitution Deliberation Committee.
There was also established an advisory group which con-
sisted of eminent lawyers, political scientists and econ-
omists. Most of them were professors, but there were also
a few civil servants.
On July 16, 1962, a special committee consisting of
nine members was established to prepare a statement of
problems that required deliberation and decision. They
identified the following problems:
(1) The content of the preamble.
(2) Rights and duties of citizens.
(3) Should reference be made to political parties?
(4) Organization and composition of National As-
sembly.
(5) Governmental system: presidential or parlia-
mentary?
(6) The judiciary.
(7) How to achieve local autonomy.
(8) Economic provisions.
(9) Constitutional safeguards.
(10) Method of amendment.
(11) Supplementary provisions.
[ VOL. 42
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(12) Should there be a new Constitution or merely
amendment of the 1948 Constitution?
On August 6, 1962, four small subcommittees were
created to formulate the principles that should be incor-
porated in the Constitution. Nationwide public hearings
were scheduled between August 23 and August 30 to ascer-
tain prevailing attitudes toward the already enumerated
major problems. There were four teams, each headed by
a member of the Constitution Deliberation Committee.
These hearings confirmed that there was a strong prefer-
ence for a presidential system of government and a uni-
cameral legislature. Great emphasis was placed upon the
need for effective constitutional safeguards to guarantee
the rights of citizens and the security of the country.
Early in October, all the subcommittees had completed
outlines of proposed provisions that were to be embodied
in various parts of the Constitution. This work was done
very thoroughly, both in terms of coverage and draftsman-
ship. Without this businesslike approach it would prob-
ably not have been possible to produce a draft Constitution
by the stipulated deadline of November 5, 1962. The
whole task of revising the Constitution took about one
hundred days.
Early in December 1962, the Supreme Council decided
to submit the Constitution Revision Bill in its original
form to a national referendum, scheduled for December 17,
1962. The Supreme Council also decided to conduct nation-
wide speaking tours to explain the Constitution Revision
Bill to the people. Thirteen teams were formed, each con-
sisting of a member of the Constitution Deliberation Com-
mittee and a well-known local person. Doubts had been
expressed by certain commentators in the opposition press
that there would be great popular interest in the referen-
dum. As it turned out, some 85 per cent of all eligible
voters participated and almost 79 per cent voted in favor
of the amended Constitution.
There can be no doubt that the election of a Consti-
tuent Assembly to draft a constitution represents a more
democratic approach to the problem. However, there were
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some democratic aspects in the Korean constitution-making
that should not be ignored. It should also be noted that
the referendum afforded an excellent opportunity to acquaint
large segments of the Korean population with the main
features of the new 'Constitution.
The question is sometimes asked: Why is the present
Korean Constitution called the Fifth Amendment when the
revision that was carried out in the fall of 1962 was of
such a drastic character? The reasons for this can be
found in considerations of international law and relations.
To the freedom-loving nations of the world, the Republic
of Korea remains the only lawful political instrument of
the Korean people. However, some states that had earlier
supported the United Nations in Korea had come to waver.
In view of this, it seemed desirable to emphasize the legal
continuity since 1948.
It might also be noted that the original Constitution,
as drafted largely by Dr. ,hin-O Yu, was a carefully pre-
pared document but it was unacceptable to Dr. Syngman
Rhee, who was then the Speaker of the National Assembly.
Dr. Rhee argued that the parliamentary type of govern-
ment would not work in Korea. He insisted on a presi-
dential system. Some Korean writers have oversimplified
the changes that were carried out by suggesting that the
regime was changed from one modeled on the German
Weimar Republic to one embodying the American presi-
dential system. It is true that the original system resem-
bled that of the German Republic, but the amended
institutional arrangement that resulted from the sweeping
amendments engineered by President Syngman Rhee was a
very distorted version of the American presidential system.
It could more readily be compared to some of the unfor-
tunate Latin American adaptations of the American model.
President Rhee used his war powers to bring into exist-
ence a highly personal dictatorship. After the fall of the
Rhee regime, Dr. Chang tried to "liberalize" the authori-
tarian regime, but his reforms and his inability to deal
with widespread corruption brought the country to the verge
of anarchy. The military intervened in May 1961 and
[ VOL. 42
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restored order. Long before the Constitution was revised
in the fall of 1962, some important steps were taken to
stabilize the country politically and economically.
The following basic changes were introduced as a result
of the 1962 constitutional revision. A presidential system,
embodying a strong executive, replaced the weak parliamen-
tary regime. A unicameral legislature replaced the bicam-
eral sytem. Great care was taken to render the judiciary
truly independent and to extend the constitutional protec-
tion of fundamental rights. Clear provisions were made
for the institutionalization of a plural party system. The
principle of local autonomy was reaffirmed. Constitutional
recognition was given to the need for an effective system
of inspection and economic planning. Great care was taken
in the drafting of the emergency provisions. .All in all,
a constant effort was made to reconcile the requirements
of political stability and authority with the aspirations
of the Korean people for greater freedom.
Certain matters, such as party and electoral provisions,
were given an unusual amount of space in the relatively
short Constitution. Others, such as local government, were
treated in somewhat rudimentary form. But, all in all,
the coverage is fairly balanced. In 1962, many intellectuals
who disliked and feared the military took the position that
the whole constitutional amendment process was likely to
be a mere sham, designed to perpetuate the military in
power. Today the Constitution is certainly not regarded
as a sham and some of the people, who were once highly
suspicious of the whole undertaking, now concede that the
constitutional revision was the indispensable foundation
for political stabilization and economic development.
There is still considerable prejudice against the mili-
tary, but most reasonable people agree that the military
has made substantial contributions to the modernization,
of the country and to the development of efficiency as well
as integrity in the public service. The former military
officers have learned the rules of parliamentary democracy
and have shown restraint in dealing with irresponsible
individuals among the opposition parties.
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President Park has conducted himself in a manner
that behooves a Chief of State. Contrary to what had been
predicted by certain critics, he has not tried to concentrate
excessive power in his hands. On the contrary, he has
progressively delegated more and more power to his sub-
ordinates.
The institution of the Prime Minister, which had been
slighted in the Constitution, has come to be of considerable
importance in the day-to-day operations of the government.
This is a very difficult job because the Prime Minister has
to be a skillful political broker and conciliator. He is
also expected to be the general coordinator of the entire
governmental machinery. To do this job effectively, he
needs a staff of outstanding professional administrators.
One institution for which no provision was made in
the Constitution is that of Deputy Prime Minister. The
position was created by ordinary legislation and linked
with that of the Minister of the Economic Planning Board.
There is some doubt as to whether this was a desirable
innovation because, in practice, the Deputy Prime Minister
has tended to become Prime Minister for Economic Affairs.
Since he also controls the budget, it becomes quite apparent
that he wields considerable power and influence.
Some of the top constitutional agencies do not func-
tion as efficiently as had been hoped. The State Council
tends to be overburdened with technical details. The
Board of Inspection is accountable to the President as well
as to the National Assembly, but there is not sufficient
follow-up in this arrangement. An Economic and Scientific
Council was established in accordance with Article 118 of
the Constitution, but it has not yet been effectively utilized.
The operation of all these top-level agencies has been
carefully analyzed by a newly created temporary Admin-
istrative Improvement Research Commission. This organ-
ization has produced some very important reports in the
course of some two years of its operation. Its recommen-
dations to the President have been endorsed and the Prime
Minister has been instructed to take appropriate action.
The implementation of these recommendations requires a
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considerable amount of legislative research. This is the
responsibility of the Office of Legislation which is attached
to the Prime Minister's Office. It is to be expected that
this office will be strengthened in the near future.
The Constitution did not specify how many ministries
there should be. This was properly left to a government
organization law, which has been amended several times.
Substantial improvements have been made in the organ-
ization and management of individual ministries. Kfforts
are under way to achieve more effective inter-ministerial
coordination.
The Constitution contains an important article (6) in
the General Provisions which declares that "(1) All public
officials shall be servants of the entire people and shall be
responsible to the people. (2) The status and the political
impartiality of a public official shall be guaranteed in
accordance with the law."
The rising cost of living has created major problems
for the civil servants. Affluent people talk glibly about
corruption but they don't realize, or don't wish to admit,
that government employees must be paid salaries that
compare favorably with prevailing salaries in commerce
and industry. The Minister of Government Administration
has made strenuous efforts to correct these inequities.
President Park realizes that the welfare of public em-
ployees must not be sacrificed for the sake of ambitious
economic development plans.
With respect to the role of political parties, the Con-
stitution contains an unusual provision (article 7) which
guarantees a "plural party system." It would be highly
desirable to evolve a functioning system of two national
political parties, but this takes time and discipline. Prog-
ress has been made to reduce factionalism, but the rules
of parliamentary procedure have not yet been firmly estab-
lished. Some opposition party leaders and would-be leaders
have repeatedly attempted to resolve political moves by
unparliamentary means. They have encouraged disorderly
demonstrations, in spite of the fact that the Constitution
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provides adequate means for the redress of legitimate
grievances.
The National Assembly has emerged as a more power-
ful body than was originally expected. Article 57 states
that "the National Assembly may inspect the administra-
tion of the State, demand the production of necessary
documents. . . ." It is widely agreed that there should be
a legislative check on the conduct of the administration.
However, it has become increasingly evident that many of
these inspections are exceedingly time consuming and in-
conclusive.
Article 58 of the Constitution makes it mandatory for
members of the Cabinet to appear in the National Assembly
to answer questions if a mere thirty members of the Na-
tional Assembly make such a request. The opposition has
repeatedly used this article to engage in political maneuvers
rather than to gain factual information. The issues in-
volved have often been trivial but they have consumed
much of the time and energy of busy cabinet members.
There are some inconsistencies that may be noted in pass-
ing: the National Assembly has the power to impeach the
President by a simple majority vote while the impeach-
ment of a National Assemblyman requires a two-thirds
majority vote.
The previously cited article 57 which authorizes the
National Assembly to "inspect the administration of the
State" states specifically that "the National Assembly shall
not interfere with judicial trial, criminal investigation in
process or prosecution."
With respect to the authority of the judiciary to inves-
tigate constitutionality, the Constitution vested this power
in the Supreme Court (article 102). At the time that the
Constitution was being drafted, there was an alternate view,
which favored the establishment of a Constitutional Court.
It may be of interest that in recent years some prominent
Korean jurists have come to believe that it would have
been better to vest this important power in a Constitutional
Court. They feel that the Supreme Court should not be
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involved in questions that can be highly technical or
political.
There are many more aspects that might be of interest
to anyone who feels that the comparative study of consi-
tutional experiments is relevant. As I have indicated, the
Korean experience is particularly pertinent. One can find
some defects in the Korean Constitution but they are
outweighed by the many sound features that were embodied
in this document. It is an effective instrument of govern-
ment under conditions of normalcy as well as emergency.
In the course of three years, it has demonstrated that it
is an effective safeguard of liberty as well as stability.
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THB -NMI CONSTITUTION
OF VILTNAM
One of the main differences in the manner in which
the Constitution of Vietnam came into being is that it was
drafted by a popularly elected Constituent Assembly of
117 members. This, of course, is a much more difficult
and troublesome procedure than the one that was followed
in Korea. But it was of the greatest importance that this
authority was derived from a popular base.
The creation of the Constituent Assembly was in itself
a most important achievement, since the Viet Cong had
made strenuous and vicious efforts to intimidate both voters
and candidates. But they failed. More than 80 per cent
of the registered voters cast their ballots on September
11, 1966. There were 532 candidates competing for 117
seats in the Constituent Assembly. The elected body rep-
resented a cross section of all strata of the population of
Vietnam. Broken down by religious affiliation, the com-
position was as follows: 34 Buddhists, 30 Catholics, 7
Confucianists, 10 Hoa Hao and 5 Cao Dai.
With regard to ethnic and regional origin, the South-
erners were the dominant group (44 members) followed by
28 Central and 27 Northern Vietnamese. There were 8
Montagnards, 4 Cambodians and 3 Chinese.
In terms of professional background, it was noted that
there were 23 educators, 22 businessmen, 18 civil servants,
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20 military, 7 farmers and 5 doctors. Only a few lawyers
and political scientists were elected to this body. The
average age was 39.
The Constituent Assembly met for the first time on
September 27, 1966, in the former Opera House in Saigon.
It did not get off to a spectacular start. Very few mem-
bers had the necessary background or experience to draft
a !Constitution, but they did their homework, studying
other constitutions and generally showing considerable com-
mon sense in the way they applied the lessons they had
learned. They organized themselves into effective working
committees, of which the Drafting Committee was clearly
the most important.
The members of the -Constituent Assembly continued
to show great courage and perseverance in the face of Viet
Cong terror. Tran Van Van, one of the most influential
members, was assassinated on his way from his home to
the Constituent Assembly. Dr. Phan Quang Dan, one of
the most promising civilian members of the Assembly, nar-
rowly escaped an assassination attempt with only minor
injuries.
Anyone who followed the debates carefully came to
realize that the constitutional pattern being put together
departed considerably from the Korean model. What was
emerging was a system based on legislative rather than
executive supremacy. If the Korean Constitution of the
Third Republic showed resemblance to that of the French
Fifth Republic, the first draft of the Constitution of Vietnam
showed closer resemblance to the French Fourth Republic,
a system hardly suitable for a country at war.
The Constituent Assembly had taken some three months
out of the authorized maximum of six to deliberate on
the underlying principles that were to be embodied in the
constitution. Just before the end of the year, the basic
principles were approved and the Drafting Committee was
instructed to prepare a Draft Constitution. This they did
in record time-a little more than a week.
The Draft Constitution, which was completed on Jan-
uary 10, 1967, still without a Preamble, ran to 135 articles.
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The final Constitution, as proclaimed on April 1, 1967,
consists of 117 articles and has a Preamble of 117 words.
The first draft had avoided any references to Communism,
but in the final version article 4 states that (1) the Repub-
lic of Vietnam opposes Communism in any form; and
(2) every activity designed to publicize or carry out Com-
munism is prohibited. Future constitutional historians
will have to explain how and why these changes were made.
The Directorate, as the National Leadership Committee
is often called, sent several messages to the President of
the Constituent Assembly in which they expressed their
views concerning certain features of the Draft Constitution.
In addition to these formal messages, there was consider-
able behind-the-scene negotiation, which ultimately pro-
duced acceptable modifications.
It must be borne in mind that the Constituent Assem-
bly owed its existence to a decree law enacted by the
National Leadership Committee. In this decree the Com-
mittee reserved the right to veto the Constitution or any
part of it. However, the Constituent Assembly could over-
rule such a veto provided it could muster a two-thirds
vote. But the strategy of the leading members of the
Assembly, from the very outset, was to avoid such a show-
down.
In any case, it should be noted that very important
and largely desirable changes were made during the first
two weeks in March. The Constitution in its present form
compares favorably with progressive and democratic con-
stitutions anywhere in the world. Certainly chapter II
which deals with the rights and duties of citizens, is an
impressive contribution to contemporary constitutionalism.
It safeguards all the essential rights which have been
enumerated in the United Nations Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. Future students will find in this chapter
interesting examples of how the members of the Constituent
Assembly resolved fundamental issues on which Buddhists
and Catholics might have disagreed.
In the first draft some of the powers that were to be
given to the bicameral legislature were clearly excessive.
1967 ]
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The Directorate objected to a number of provisions which
seemed to generate uncertainty and instability. 'Some
prominent members objected to the original article 39
which would have given the National Assembly the right
to decide when a state of emergency is to be proclaimed.
In the final version this power has been deleted. However,
it is still authorized to "determine declarations of war
and holding of peace talka"
In one area the position of the National Assembly in
relationship to the President has been significantly strength-
ened. The original article 55 of the first draft stated that
the President may ask the National Assembly to amend a
bill or to reconsider one or more provisions of the bill. In
such cases the two houses would meet in a joint session.
To overrule the objections of the President, a two-thirds
vote of the total membership of both houses was required.
In the final version of the article (45) "an absolute major-
ity of the total number of Representatives and Senators"
is required.
As far as the Executive is concerned, the Korean model
is quite apparent. But in addition to the President, pro-
vision is also made for a Vice-President. In the final
version the hand of the President has been strengthened
in his capacities as Chief Executive and Commander-in-
Chief. In the first draft the powers of the President to
deal with emergencies were unrealistically limited. Article
78 of that version stated that "if the National Assembly
cannot be convened in time," the President may declare a
state of emergency. But the same article made it manda-
tory to convene the National Assembly "within three days
after the President promulgates such a decree in order to
consider it." This provision was ill-advised for the reason
that in cases of real emergency, the President must be able
to act decisively. There would be no time for delibera-
tions in the National Assembly. The other provision de-
manding a legislative review within three days might readily
be exploited by using a hit-and-run strategy.
In the final version this important matter has been
settled in article 64. It is probably one of the most care-
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fully drafted emergency articles in existence and it may be
useful to quote the entire text to show how the system of
checks and balances continues to function, even under
emergency conditions:
(1) In special situations, the President may sign decrees declar-
ing states of emergency, curfew or alert over part or all
of the territory of the country.
(2) The National Assembly must meet no later than twelve
days after the date of promulgation of the decree in order
to ratify, amend or reject it.
(3) If the National Assembly rejects or amends the President's
decree, the special situations which were decreed will end
or be modified accordingly.
With respect to the judiciary, it should be noted that
its independence had never been effectively safeguarded
under the Diem regime. It clearly needed to be extricated
from the control of the executive. The Constituent Assem-
bly's first draft showed that it had succeeded in doing that
but many qualified observers felt that now the judiciary
was in danger of becoming the pawn of the legislature.
On February 27, 1967, in a letter addressed to the Chair-
man of the Constituent Assembly, the Chairman of the
National Leadership Committee raised strong objections to
certain provisions pertaining to the Special Court, the
Inspectorate, the Supreme Court and the High Judicial
Council. The National Leadership Committee argued that
in all of these cases the legislature had been given a dis-
proportionate amount of power. In the final version, the
most objectionable features have been corrected.
The provision for elected province chiefs, which ap-
peared in the Draft Constitution, was among the issues
that tended to generate dissension between the Directorate
and the Constituent Assembly. The Directorate objected
to it for several reasons. In their view it would be danger-
ous to attempt this experiment in times of war. But per-
haps no less important is the fact that most of the presently
appointed province chiefs are military officers whose posi-
tions might be in jeopardy. A solution was found in
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axticle 114 which stipulates that during the first presiden-
tial term, the President may appoint province chiefs.
The area in which a serious clash was expected by
many qualified observers concerned the transitional provi-
sions. It should be noted that the original decree which
provided for the election of the Constituent Assembly stip-
ulated that this body would cease to exist upon completing
its task. However, when the Draft Constitution was re-
leased on January 10, 1967, readers were surprised to dis-
cover that the Constituent Assembly had taken it upon
itself to prolong its existence. Some of the members of
the Constituent Assembly argued privately that they were
not bound by the provisions of the decree because they
derived their authority directly from the people.
In the Draft 'Constitution, article 130 proposed to leave
executive powers with the National Leadership Committee
"until such time as the President and Vice-President have
been elected by the People for their first term."
Article 131 announced that the Constituent Assembly
would assume legislative powers "until a constitutional
government and the first National Assembly had been es-
tablished." Under the tentative time schedule provided
for in the subsequent articles, the -Constituent Assembly
might have remained in power for as much as eighteen
months.
All this had now been drastically altered due to the
newly drafted transitional provisions which had been in-
corporated into the final version of the Constitution.
Article 109 now provides:
During the transitional period, the National Assembly popularly
elected on September 11, 1966, representing the people of the
nation in the legislative sphere, will:
1. Draft and approve:
Election laws for the election of the President and
Vice-President, Upper House and Lower House; laws
organizing the Supreme Court and the Inspectorate;
political party and press regulations.
2. Ratify treaties.
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Tnder the provisions of article 110, this limited legis-
lative mandate will temporarily be expanded until the first
National Legislative Assembly is convened. In practice,
this will amount to four or five weeks, because the presi-
dential elections have already been scheduled for September
1, 1967, and the elections for the National Assembly will
be concluded by October 1, 1967.
Now that the 'Constitution has been promulgated, a
tremendous amount of work lies ahead with respect to its
implementation. In a short period of time some eighteen
major laws will have to be enacted because the Constitution
makes this mandatory. A great deal of work will also be
required in the area of civil and criminal procedure to
bring the existing legislation in harmony with the guaran-
tees which are contained in Chapter II of the Constitution.
The Minister of Justice has already appointed a commis-
%son to make a careful inventory of the changes that are
required, and he expects to have this report by June 1, 1967.
Judging from past performance, there will be no delay in
"bringing justice closer to the people."
As one reflects on these recent developments, one
cannot help but be impressed that such complex matters
could be successfully carried out in the midst of war and
turmoil. The American people may be slow in realizing it,
but Korea and Vietnam have taken decisive steps toward
achieving the rule of law.
